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Justice Mathew, of the Queen's Bench Division of England,
has lately held, in accordance with the rule that all the arbitrators must concur in the award, that under an
Arbitration
agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration which
and Award,
Concurrence provided that it should be referred to "the decisof Arbitrators

ion of one or of three disinterested arbitrators as
mutually agreed," and that if three arbitrators were appointed
one should be nominated by each of the parties, and the third
by the two thus nominated, an award made by two only of
three arbitrators thus appointed was invalid: United Kingdom
Mutual S. S. Assurance Assn. v. Houston & Co., [1896] I
Q. B. 567.
An agreement to submit a matter in dispute to two arbitrators, by whom an umpire is to be chosen, to act only upon
matters of difference between the arbitrators, does not authorize one arbitrator and the umpire to return an award conclusive upon the parties concerned, without showing a difference
between the arbitrators: Mffrs'. & Builders' Fire Ins. Co. v.
Mullen, (Supreme Court of Nebraska,) 67 N. W. Rep. 445.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Assignment

Iowa, when an assignment for the benefit of credi-

for Benefit of
Creditors,
Partnership,

tors has been made by a firm, and also by the
partners individually, the holder of a note executed

Rights of
Creditors of
both Firm
.and Individual
Partners

by the firm and by the individual members is
entitled to have the estates of the partnership and
of each partner kept separate, and to receive a
dividend from each, though the note was given for

a firm liability: In re Carter,67 N. W. Rep. 239.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138, affirming
I I So. Rep. 948, the Supreme Court of the United States has
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,Constitutional
Law,
Civil Rights,
Negroes,
Separate
Accommoda.
tions

decided, against the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice
Harlan, that a State statute which requires railroad

companies to provide separate accommodations for
white and colored persons, and makes a passenger
who insists on occupying a coach or compartment
other than the one set apart for his race liable to fine or imprisonment, does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude, nor the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibiting any abridgment of the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States, or any deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, or by
denying them the equal protection of the laws.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, Eden v. People, 43 N. E. Rep. i io8, the act of that
-DueProcessof State of June 26, 1895, forbidding barbers to keep
open their shops or work at their trade on SunLaw,
:Prohibition of
Sunday Work
by Barbers

day, is a taking of property without due process
of law, within Art. 2, sec. 2, of the Constitution of

Illinois, providing that no person shall be deprived of liberty
or property without due process of law, since "the common
law of England, as adopted in this State as a part oFi-6br
jurisprudence, does not prohibit the citizen from pursuing his
ordinary labor on Sunday."
This argument is not convincing, from the fact that it could
be applied equally well to nullify prohibitions of other tradese.g-., liquor-selling; but the second ground on which the act
is held unconstitutional deserves more consideration. That
ground is, that it is in contravention of Art. 4, sec. 22, of the
State Constitution, which provides that no special law shall be
enacted when a general law can be made applicable, thus
prohibiting the legislature, according to the majority opinion,
from singling out one special trade or species of labor for
animadversion.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Fesler v. Brayton,
44 N. E. Rep. 37, has lately declared that a
Legislative
suit to enjoin the holding of an election for
Apportionment,
Enjoining
Election

members of the legislature under an apportionment act, on the ground that it is unconstitu-
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tional, should not be entertained, when the act assailed is
the only one in force.
Marks, J., dissented with much force; and it is to be feared
that the decision of the court was based on expediency rather
than on legal principles. But if ever the end justifies the
means, this case was certainly an instance.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts still clings
tenaciously to the obsolete idea of the inherent disability of
women. It recently, in answer to the request of
Women
the legislature for its opinion on the point, declared
as Notaries,
Power of

Legislature

that the Constitution of the State did not, when

considered in connection with the history and

nature of the office of notary public, and the usages of that
and other States with reference thereto at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, authorize the appointment of
women as notaries; and that since the Constitution did not
authorize the appointment of women to that office, the legislature could not confer power upon the governor and council
to appoint them: In re Opinion of the Justices, 34 Atl. Rep. 927
On an application recently made to the Queen's Bench
Division for an attachment against the publisher of a newscertain
paper, for contempt of court in publishing
Contempt o
articles relative to a cause then pending, it appeared
Court,
that the applicant, whQ had been sub-editor and
Newspaper
Publication

manager of the paper, had been charged with an
attempt to commit arson, and had been remanded for a further
hearing. An article was then published in the paper, alluding
to the facts that the property of the newspaper company was
for sale, that the applicant had been arrested, and that the
charge of arson was still pending. That charge was afterwards
dismissed, but others were preferred, on two of which theapplicant was committed for trial. While he was awaiting
trial another article was published, stating that the paper had
been purchased by one of the respondents and asking for support, and also alluding to the charges against the applicant; and
shortly afterwards a report was published of the proceedings
at a meeting of a county council committee, at which a resolu-
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tion was carried that the action of the chief constable in
obtaining legal assistance for the police in the case of the
pending prosecution against the applicant should be confirmed.
The application was refused, however, on the ground that it
did not appear that the articles referred to in: any-way- tended
or were designed to prejudice the fair trial of the charges against
the applicant: Queen v. Payne, [1896] 1 Q. B. 577.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
recently decided, in Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed.
Copyright,
Common-law
Rights of

Author

Rep. 196, that the passage of the copyright stat-

utes has not abrogated the common-law right of
an autlor to his unpublished manuscript. The

facts of the case were as follows: The plaintiff
wrote a poem, in pursuance of an agreement entered into by
her with the managers of the World's Columbian Exposition,
and submitted it to them. They accepted it, and paid her the
price agreed, and she gave them a receipt "in full payment of
ode composed by me," which receipt also provided that the
exposition company should have the right to furnish copies to
the press for publication, and to publish the poem in the official history of the dedication ; subject to which the plaintiff
reserved her copyright therein. After this, but before the
plaintiff or the company published the poem in any way, the
defendant obtained a copy of the poem, and published it in its
newspaper, without the consent and against the will of the
plaintiff and the company. This was held to be an infringement of the common-law right of the plaintiff to control the
publication of her poem, for which she could recover, and that
this right was in no way affected or abrogated by the copyright laws; and that the defendant having knowingly and
wantonly published the poem against the will of the plaintiff and
the exposition company, was liable for exemplary damages.
The Court of Appeal of England has lately ruled, that as
the directors of a corporation are the managing
Corporations,
body they can at any meeting of the board deal
Directors'
with all the affairs of the company then requiring
Meetings,
Notice

attention, whether ordinary or not, [provided it be
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within their powers,] and that previous notice of the special
business transacted is not a prerequisite to the validity of the
proceedings: La Compagnie de Mayville v. Witley, [1896]
i Ch. 788.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, a covenant
that a house shall be set back twenty feet from a certain line
is not violated by the extension of an open porch
Deed,
Covenant, over that line: Hawes v. Favor, 43 N. E. Rep.
1076. This is in direct conflict with the rulings
Building
Restrictions

of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Ogontz
Land & Imp. Co. v. Johnson, 31 At]. Rep. ioo8, and of
Massachusetts, in Reardon v. Murphy, 4o N. E. Rep. 854,
(34 Am.L. REG. N. S. 428,) but agrees with Graham v. Hite,
93 Ky. 474The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York,
First Department, has reversed the decision of the Special
Descent and Term for New York County, in In re Fleming, 38
Distribution, N. Y. Suppl. 611, (see 35 Am. L. REG. N. S. 388,)
and holds that the mere fact that an indictment is
Murder
of Ancestor
pending against an heir for the murder
of his
ancestor is no ground for refusing him payment of his share
of the estate: In re Fleming, 39 N. Y. Suppl. 156.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, the -fact that part of the election officers
absent themselves during part of the election
Conduct,

Electons,
Regularity,
Absence of
Officers

hours, and that during the absence of the clerk
one of the judges of election acts in his place, and

signs his name on the back of the ballots, does not render the
election void: Major v. Barker, 35 S. W. Rep. 543.
The House of Lords, in Universal Stock Exctz., Ltd., v.
Strachan [1896] App. Cas. 166, has held, affirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals [1895] 2 Q. B.
Gaming
329, (see 34 AM.L. REG. N. S.642,) that when
Contracts,
Stocks,
both parties to a contract for the sale and purDifferences,
Recovery of chase of stocks intend that no stocks shall be
delivered, and that "differences" only shall be
Margins
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accounted for, the mere fact that the contracts provide that
either party may require that the purchase be completed and
the stocks delivered or received, (as the case may be), does
not prevent it from being a gaming contract; but that in
such a transaction securities deposited by one of the parties
with the other to secure the payment of differences are not
deposited "to abide the event," within themeaning of sec. 18
of the Gaming Act of 1845, (8 & 9 Vict. c. IO9,) and are
recoverable by action.
According to a recent decision of the Queen's Bench
Division, an action will not lie against a gas
Gas Works,
Breach of
company for damages sustained by a consumer
Statutory
Duty,
Remedy

by reason of the failure of the company to give
him a supply of gas of the amount and purity

required by law. His only remedy is that provided by statute:
Clegg, Parkinson& Co. v. Earby Gas Co., [1896] I Q. B. 592.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in Peltier v.
Bradley, 34 Atl. Rep. 712, has lately ruled, that one who
drives a truck on the lefthand side of the street, in
Highways,
Law of the
order to reach his employer's store, which is
Road,
Truck,
Bicycles

situated on that side, is only bound to exercise
ordinary care to avoid colliding with vehicles

approaching from the opposite direction; and that when the
driver of a truck drove along the lefthand side of the street, to
reach his employer's store, and collided with a bicycle coming
from the opposite direction, the rider of which attempted to
pass between the truck and the curb in front of the store,
the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were
questions of fact, on which the findings of the trial court were
conclusive.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently had before it
a very interesting case in reference to parental authority. A
Roman Catholic married a Protestant woman by
Infants,
Religious
whom he had six children. At the time of the
Education,
Parental
marriage it was agreed that the children should be
Authority
brought up as Catholics, but the father did not
insist upon it, and as long as the mother lived he allowed her
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to bring them up in her own faith. The same was done for
several years after her death; the father, who had become
intemperate, and was several times convicted of disorderly
conduct, allowing them to attend Protestant schools and
religious services. Four of the children died, and he neglected
the two survivors, so that they were found by relatives in a
state of destitution, and removed from the father's house.
Meanwhile they had been left an annuity by an aunt; and an
application was therefore made to the court, which after due
notice to the father, and his failure to appear, made an order
committing them to the custody of a Protestant clergyman for
four years, and providing that they should be placed at a
specified Protestant school. About a year later the father
petitioned that they might be removed to a Roman Catholic
school, alleging that he had reformed, and become a religious
man, but after careful consideration Kekewich, J., refused to
grant the order asked for, on the ground that the father had
by his conduct deprived himself of his right to exercise the
parental authority which was otherwise his, and that under the
circumstances it would be detrimental to the interest of the
children to alter their religious training, after they had been
so long educated as Protestants. This decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeal: In re Newton, [1896] I Ch. 740.
The Supreme Court of the United States has lately ruled,
36 N. E. Rep. 505, that as the so-called
affirming
Inheritance
,
tax " of New York is really a limita"inheritance
Tax,
tion on the power of a testator to bequeath his
property, and not a tax on the property itself,
it
States:
the
United
to
a
legacy
on
imposed
may be legally
United States v. Perkins, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1073.
Legacy to

United States

A contract insuring a carrier of passengers against liability
for injuries to its passengers is not void as against public
policy on the ground that it relieves the carrier
Insurance,
of his duties to the public, or lessens his liability
Casualty,
for negligence: Boston & Alban , R. R. Co. v.
Validity
17f,'rcantile Tmist & Deposit Co., (Court of Appeals of Maryland,) 34 Atl. Rep. 778.
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The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
lately held, that the contract by which a corporation undertakes, in consideration of premiums paid, to inCredit
Insurance,
Conditions,

Interpretation

demnify the other party to the contract against

losses by uncollectible debts, is not a contract of
suretyship, but of insurance, in spite of the fact

that the corporation calls itself a "guarantee" or "surety"
company; and as such is subject to the rule that any ambiguities in the policy drawn up by the insurer, who makes his own
conditions, are to be resolved against the draftsman: and
accordingly that in a policy by which the company agrees to
purchase from the insured an amount of uncollectible debts
not exceeding $15,000 in excess of one-half of one per cent.
of their total gross sales and deliveries, a provision that "the
contract is issued on the basis that the yearly sales and deliveries of the insured are between $i,8oo,ooo and $2,500,000,"
was not a stipulation that the total sales and deliveries, on
which the one-half of one per cent. is to be computed, must
amount to at least $i,8oo,ooo, but that the insured might
recover from the insurer his losses, not exceeding $15,006, in
excess of one-half of one per cent. on his actual total of sales
and deliveries during the year: Tebbets v. Mfercantile Credit
Guarantee Co. of N. Y., 73 Fed. Rep, 95.
A fire in a chimney, caused by the accidental ignition of
soot, or the smoke issuing from such a fire, is
Fire
Insurance,
within a policy of fire insurance on goods conIgnition
Sootinof
tained in the building, which purports to cover all
Chimney

loss or damage by fire: TVa), v. Abington Miut.

.FireIns. Co., (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 43
N. E. Rep. 1032.
Judge Clark, of the Middle District of Tennessee, in a long
and carefully considered opinion, has recently examined and
summarized with great thoroughness the powers
Interstate
Commerce,
and duties of the Interstate Commerce CommisPowers of
soon, and has laid down the broad lines on which
Commission
Competitive
that body ought to proceed in settling the quesRates
tion as to the legality of rates. He holds: (i)
That
the report of the commission in a given case should show
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what the issues in the case are, and what facts it finds inregard to such issues; that it should not state mere conclusions of law or fact, but should make a suitable reference to
the evidence when there is a conflict in th! proof, and show
how the commission settles the disputed fact, or if the evidence
is undisputed, should so state; that whenever it is the duty of
the commission to receive and pass upon evidence of certain
facts, its failure to do so is error of law, as is its failure to dispose of an issue of fact raised before it; and that it has no
power to fix rates; (agreeing on this latter point with Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 700;) (2) That since the carrier's business
of transporting goods involves the rights and interests of three
parties-the seller at the point of departure, the carrier itself,.
and the trader or consumer at the point of delivery-all these.
must be duly considered in passing upon the reasonableness.
of a given rate; and, therefore, there must be taken into,
account, besides the mere *difference in charges, the convenience of the public, the fair interests of the carrier, the relative quantities or volume of the traffic involved, the relative
cost of the services and profit to the company, and the situation and circumstances of the respective customers, with referetice to each other, as competitive or otherwise: and (3) That
when traffic from a distance can compete with traffic nearer
the market, the public interests demand that the more distant
traffic shall be carried at rates that will permit it to competewith the nearer traffic; that the position of a trader who can
use two competing routes calls for consideration as much as
the geographical position of another trader who, though
having no competing route, is situated nearer the market;
that the fact that a lower rate is charged from a more distant
point because of a competing route should be taken into
account; that mileage, while always a factor in the case, is.
by no means the controlling one, or the most important; and
that lower rates, if offered in good faith to all upon equal
terms, may lawfully be charged in summer on certain classes
of freight: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisvillc & N..
R. R. -Co., 73 Fed. Rep. 409.
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In Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.
lO96, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently
Stoppage of reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of
Railroad
Illinois, (33 N. E. Rep. 173,) under the statute
Trains
of that State, (Rev. Stat. III. 1889, c. 114, § 88,)
providing that all regular passenger trains shall stop a sufficient length of time at the railroad stations and county seats.
to receive and let off passengers with safety, which compelled
a fast mail train, carrying interstate passengers and the United
States mail from Chicago to places south of the Ohio River,
over an interstate highway established by authority of Congress,
to turn aside from the direct interstate route, and run to the
station in Cairo, three and a-half miles away from that route,
and back again, in order to receive and discharge passengers
at that station, though the company had provided other and
ample accommodation for interstate travel to and from that
station; reversing it on the ground that the statute, so construed,
was an unconstitutional obstruction of interstate commerce,
and of the passage of the mails, and could not be considered
as a valid police regulation.
The Chief Justice of England has lately held that the proprietor of a house licensed to sell intoxicating liquors is guilty
of an offence under the licensing act, in his servant,
Intoxicating
during his absence, and against his orders, sells to a
Liquors,
Illegal Sale by drunken person; since the act of the servant is
Servant
Against Master's Orders,
Liability of
Master

within the general scope of his employment:

Commissioners of Police v. Cartman, [I896] I

Q. B, 655.
This decision is in accord with the weight of authority in
the United States: Edgar v. State, 45 Ark. 356, 1885;
'17oler v. State, 47 Ark. IIO, 1886; Loeb v. State, 75 Ga.
258, 1885; Boatright v. State, 77 Ga. 717, 1886; Snider v.
State, 8i Ga. 753, 1888;
cCutlen v. Po., 69 Ill. 6oi,
1873; Noecker v. Peo., 91 Ill. 494, 1879; Fahey v. State, 62
Miss. 402, 1884; Teasdale v. State, (Miss.) 3 So. Rep. 245,
1887; State v. Kittelle, (N. C.) 15 S. E. Rep. 103, 1892; Sttte

v. Denoon, 31 W. Va.

122,

1888 ; Contra, Barnes v. State, 19,
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Conn. 398, 1849; State v. McCance, 110 Mo. 398, 1892;
State v. Weber, i i i Mo. 204, 1892; Anderson v. State, 22
,Ohio St. 305, 1892. The futility of the reasoning on which
this depends is well exposed in State v. McCance, iO Mo.
398, 1892 ; and the whole subject is discussed in 14 Crim. L.
Mag. 859. It may be added, however, to what is there said,
that the contention of the Chief Justice in this case, that the
act is within the scope of the servant's employment, means, if
it means anything, that the servant is employed to sell illegally-a conclusion which he had no right to draw. On the
other hand, if this is not the case, then the master was not
guilty. The ruling is indefensible on any ground.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has lately held, that the
landlord of a building divided into apartments, access to which
.andlord and is had by a common 1assage, owes to those who
Tenant,
visit his tenants on lawful occasions the same duty
.Apartment that he owes to the tenants themselves; that this
House,

Duty to
Visitors

duty requires him to take reasonable care to have
the common halls and stairways reasonably
fit for

use for the passage of the tenants, but not to furnish means for
their safe use, and therefore not to furnish light at night, (unless
by special contract,) even though light is necessary for their
safe use; and that a visitor of a tenant, who passed down a
stairway, with which she was not familiar, in the dark, without
waiting for a companion who was familiar with it, or asking a
light from her friend, and using no precautions for safety but
by feeling with her hands and feet, did not act as a reasonably
prudent person, and contributed by her own negligence to
injuries which she received by falling down stairs: Gleason v.
Boeh n, 34 Atl. Rep. 886.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has recently
passed upon a question of great importance concerning the
law of libel. The defendant, a publishing comLibel,
Privilege,

pany, having

published

in

its

newspaper

an

Malice,

Comment on article charging the plaintiff with breach of trust
Suit
as a public officer, he began at once an action of

libel against it, whereupon it proceeded to publish an article
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representing the suit as vexatious and malicious, and impugning the private character of the plaintiff, for the purpose of
prejudicing the public against him. With regard to the first
of these articles, the court held that though a publication
charging a public officer with breach of trust might be privileged, if the publisher believed it true, yet if accompanied- by
comments that showed it to have been made maliciously, it
would be libelous per se; and with regard to the second, that
it was libelous on its face: Atwater v. Morning News Co., 34
Atl. Rep, 865.
In Bi/iingsley v. Maas, 67 N. W. Rep. 49, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin recently held, that while a full and cornMalicious
Prosecution,
Cause,
Advice of
Counsel

plete statement of the facts to a reputable attorney,
and the filing of a criminal charge on his advice,
in good faith and without any ulterior motive,
constitute a complete defence to an action for
malicious prosecution, yet though the other facts

may be established beyond doubt, the question of good faith
is for the jury, when different minds might draw different conclusions from the evidence,
The House of Lords has lately ruled, reversing~oodBarrsv.
Heriot, [1895] 2 Q. B. 212, and overruling, pro
Married
Woman's
tania, flood Barfs v. Cat/wart, [1894] 2 Q. B.
feparato
Estate,

Restraint

on Anticipa=
tion,
Arrears of
Income,
Liability

$59, that when a married woman is entitled to
property for her separate use without power of
anticipation, the restraint on anticipation does not
apply to income accrued due; so that a judgment
creditor may enforce the judgment against income

which has accrued due at or before the date of the judgment:
Hood Barrs v. Heriot, [1896] App. Cas. 174.
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of New
laster and Hampshire, the defendants, who were decorators
Servant,
employed in decorating an office building, hired
Liability for
Larceny by
Servant

b

two persons to assist them. The plaintiff having
gone away, leaving his room locked, the defend-

.ants, in order to promote their work, ordered one of their

450
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assistants to enter the room through the window. He did so,.
and admitted the other by the door. They remained there for
an hour or so, during which time one of them stole a diamond
ring. Neither of the defendants entered or went ,near the
room. The plaintiff sued to recover the value of the ring; but
the court held, that though trespass q. c. f. would lie for
nominal damages and for any actual and consequential damages
naturally caused by the breaking and entering under the
defendants' orders, trespass de bonis asportatiswould not lie
for the ring, as the larceny of it was not an act within the
scope of the assistants' employment: Searle v. Parke, 34 At.
Rep. 744.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, the foreman of a section crew and an engineer in charge of a locomotive drawing a train not connected with the
Master and
work of the section men are not fellow-servants
Servant,
Fellow-

within the meaning of the rule

forbidding

a

Servant

recovery for injuries caused by the negligence of
a fellow-servant: Omaha & R. V. R. R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl,
67 N. W. Rep. 447.
In Pledge v. White [1896], App. Cas. 187, the House of
Lords, affirming [1895] i Ch. 5', which affirmed [1894]
Mortgage,
Consolidation,

Redemption

2

Ch. 328, has lately held, that when the owner

of different properties mortgages them to different
persons, and the mortgages afterward become

united in title, the holder of the mortgages has a right to
consolidate them, and to refuse to be redeemed as to one
without payment of what is due to him on all, not only as
against the mortgagor, but also as against a person in
whom the equities of redemption of all the properties have
been vested by one deed, whether from the mortgagor or
mesne assignee, although the assignment is made before the
mortgages become united in title.
A city ordinance which may be reasonable and valid as
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.applied to one set of facts and circumstances, may be unreasonable and invalid when applied to facts and
Miunicipal
Corporation, circumstances of a different character; and accordingly an ordinance which prohibits driving
Ordinance,
Construction

upon the streets of a city at a greater rate than
six miles an hour, without any exceptions, is unreasonable and
void when applied to the case of members of a salvage corps
or fire patrol, responding to an alarm of fire sent to their
station from the headquarters of the city fire department:
State v. Sheppard, (Supreme Court of Minnesota,) 67 N. W.
Rep. 62.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, a company that maintains a bathing resort, and lets
out its privileges to the public for hire, is bound to
Negiigence,
Proprietor of take such precautions for the safety of bathers as a
person of ordinary prudence would take under the
Bathing
Resort,
Failure
to use
Proper

circumstances, and whether or not proper precauPrecautions tions have been taken is ordinarily a question for
for safety of the jury; and consequently, when such a company
Patrons
was notified of the disappearance of
a bather so
soon after he had been seen as to warrant the inference that an
immediate search in the water would have resulted in his
rescue before death, and the company had no one present to
watch bathers and rescue those in danger, and such agents of
the company as were present failed to make any search in the
water for the missing man, it is error to instruct the jury to
return a verdict for the company in an action for the recovery
of damages for his death: Brotherton v. M11anhattan Beadi
Znip. Co., 67 N. W. Rep. 479.
In Jf'iborg v. United States, I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. I 127, affirming 73 Fed. Rep. 159, the Supreme Court of the United States
has for the first time passed upon any of the
Neutrality
numerous questions arising out of the expeditions
Law,
in aid of Cuba equipped within and sent from the
Violation
United States. The court held:
(i) That Rev. Stat. U. S. § 5286, which makes it a

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

criminal offence to provide or prepare the means for a militaryexpedition or enterprise against a people with whom the
United States are at peace, applies to the providing or preparing of means of transportation for such an expedition or
enterprise;
(2) That when a body of men went on board a tug loaded
with boxes of arms, and were taken by it thirty or forty miles
out to sea, where, by prior arrangement, they met a steamer
outside the three-mile limit, boarded her, embarked the boxes,.
opened them, distributed the arms among themselves, drilled
on board, to some extent at least, being apparently officered,
and, as prearranged, disembarked near the coast of Cuba, presurnably to effect an armed landing thereon-that from all
this the jury might find that it was a military expedition orenterprise, within the meaning of the Revised Statutes;
(3)That it was proper for the court to charge that any
combination of men organized in the United States to go to
Cuba, to make war upon its government, provided with arms.
and ammunition, constituted a military expedition; and that
it was not necessary that the men should be drilled, put in
uniform, nor prepared for efficient service; but that it was
enough if they had combined and organized in the United
States to go to Cuba and make war on a foreign government,
and had provided themselves with the means of doing so;
(4)That if the officers of a foreign vessel, sailing from a
United States port, which, after passing the three-mile limit,.
took aboard men and arms for an expedition in violation of
the neutrality law, had prepared for sailing, and, had taken
aboard extra boats while in port, with knowledge of the proposed expedition, they were guilty of the crime in the district
from which they sailed;
(5) But if mates of a foreign vessel, sailing from a United
States port, did not know at the time of- sailing that the
vessel was to carry an expedition in violation of the neutrality
law, and did not learn that fact until they met, beyond the
three-mile limit, another vessel that carried men and arms,.
which were transferred to their vessel, they were not guilty
of an offence against the Revised Statutes.
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The Court of Appealslof Maryland has lately held, that the
deposit made with the proposal for the execution
Public
of a public contract is in the nature of a penalty,
Contracts,
Bids,
Deposit,
Penalty

and that it can be enforced only to the extent of'
the actual loss resulting from a failure to complete

the contract:

Villson v. Zkfayor, &c., of Baltimore, 34 Atl.

Rep. 774,

When a dealer sells to a consumer food sealed in a can, and
Sale of Food, the buyer knows that the seller has not prepared
Wholesomenor inspected it, and is ignorant of its contents,
n Ss,
except so far as the fact that he has purchased it.
Implied
, arranty
from others goes, there is no implied warranty on
the part of the seller that it is wholesome and fit for use :Julian v. Laubenberger, (Supreme Court of New York, Trial
Term, Kings Co.,) 38 N. Y. Suppl. 1052.
In a recent English case, Reynolds v. Tomlinson, [1896]
I Q. B. 586, a ship was chartered to proceed with
Shipping,
a cargo of grain to a port of call "for orders to
Charter
Party,
discharge at a safe port." Itwas also provided
Safe Port.
in the charter party that discharge should be according to the
customs of the port of discharge and all at one port; that thecharterers should have the privilege of naming the discharging
dock; and that the dock should be one into which the vessel
could at once safely enter and lie afloat at all times. She was
ordered to discharge at Gloucester, the basin at which is
approached by a canal seventeen miles long. On arriving at
Sharpness, which is at the entrance of the canal, it was found
that the vessel was of too great a draught to proceed up the
canal. The charterers then requested the master to discharge
a sufficient part of the cargo at Sharpness to allow her to navigate the canal, and to proceed to Gloucester with the rest; but
the master refused to do so, and discharged the whole at
Sharpness, which, for commercial purposes, is a different port
from Gloucester. The charterers then brought action forbreach of the charter party. The county court permitted
them to recover, but on appeal it was held, that the port of
Gloucester was not a safe port within the meaning of the
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-charter party, since the vessel could not reach it safely with a
full cargo ; and that evidence of a custom of the port for vessels carrying grain to be lightened at Sharpness in order to
allow them to proceed up the canal to Gloucester was inadmissible, being inconsistent with the clause of the charter
party which provided that the vessel should be discharged "at
a safe port."
The case of The Alhambra, 6 P. D. 68, 1881, was very like
the present one. There the discharge, which was to be at a
safe port, was ordered to be at Lowestoft. On arriving there,
it was found that the ship drew too much water to get into the
.harbor; and the master, instead of lightening her at Lowestoft
Roads, and then going into the harbor, as requested, went on
to Harwich, and there discharged. The court held that he
was justified in so doing, because Lowestoft was not a " safe
port," and evidence of a custom to lighten the ships in the
roads before going into the harbor was not admissible, as being
inconsistent with the charter party.
In Electric Lighting Co. of Mobile v. Mobile & S. H . Ry. Co.,
19 So. Rep. 72 1, the Supreme Court of Alabama has affirmed
the decision of the Chancery Court of Mobile
Specific
Performance, County, refusing to decree the specific performContract
for Supplying ance of a contract for an unexpired term of years
Electric
which imposed on the complainant the performMotive Power ance
of continuous mechanical services (in
the
generation of electricity) demanding the highest degree of
skill, and on the defendant the duty of maintaining costly
machinery, and the daily use of cars moved by electricity on
the line of its railway.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently passed upon
a new phase of the pernicious activity of the trades unions, in
j. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins, [ 1896] I Ch. 81 I.
Strike,
"Picketing," The defendants, who were officers of a trades
Injunction union, ordered a strike against the plaintiffs, who
were manufacturers, and also against one Scott, who made
goods for the plaintiffs only; and by their direction their
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pickets watched and beset the works of the plaintiffs and
Scott for the purpose of persuading workpeople to abstain
from working for the plaintiffs. This was held by the Court
of Appeal, affirming the decision of North, J., to be within the
provisions of sec. 7, subsec. 4, of the Conspiracy and Protection of Trade Act, 1875, (38 & 39 Vict. c. 86,) which
denounces a penalty against " every person who, with a view
to compel any other person to abstain from doing, or to do
any act which such other person has a legal right to do or
abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority...
watches or besets the house or other place where such other
person resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens
to be, or the approach to such house or place," but further
provides that "attending at or near the house or place where
a person resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens
to be, or the approach to such house or place, in order merely
to obtain or communicate information, shall not be deemed a
watching or besetting within the meaning of this section;"
and accordingly granted an injunction to restrain the defendants and their agents from watching or besetting the plaintiffs'
works for .the purpose of persuading or otherwise preventing
persons from working for them, or for an) purpose except
merely to obtain or communicate information; and also to
restrain the defendants from preventing Scott or any other
persons from working for the plaintiffs by withdrawing his
or their workmen from their employment.
In Rcddawa, v. Banham, [1896] App. Cas. 199, the House
of Lords has decided, reversing [1895] 1 Q. B. 286, (see 34
A.% L. REG. N. S. 167,) that a trader is not
Trade Name,
Descriptive
entitled to pass off his goods as the goods cf
Words,
another trader by selling them under a name
Imitation,
Tendency
which is likely to deceive purchasers, whether
to Deceive

buying directly from himself, or from others, into
the belief that they are buying the goods of the other trader,
although the name used is priniarily merely a true description
of the goods ; and accordingly that when the plaintiff had for
years made belting and sold it as " Camel's Hair Belting," bo
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that the name had come to mean in the trade the plaintiff's
belting and nothing else, and the defendant began to sell belting made of camel's hair yarn, and stamped it " Camel's Hair
Belting," so as to be likely to mislead purchasers into the
'belief that it was the plaintiff's belting, thus endeavoring to
pass off his goods as the plaintiff's, the latter was entitled to
an injunction, to restrain the defendant from using the word
" Camel's Hair " as descriptive of or in connection with belting
made or sold or offered for sale by him and not manufactured
,by the plaintiff, without clearly distinguishing that from the
.plaintiff's belting, or from describing his belting so as to
represent that it was the plaintiff's belting, or to induce such
-a belief.
.In Chilling-worth v. Chambers, [1896] I Ch. 685, the plaintiff and defendant, who were trustees of a will, invested trust
funds, part of the trust estate, in securities authorTrust",
Breach of
ized by the will. While thus a trustee, the plaintiff became also entitled to a share of the trust
Trust,
Liability of

estate as a beneficiary. The investments, some of
which were made before and some after the
plaintiff became a beneficiary, turned out insufficient, and the plaintiff and defendant were declared jointly and severally liable to
make good the loss. The whole of it was made good out of
the plaintiff's share of the trust estate, which share exceeded
the loss; and he then applied for contribution from the defendant. But the Court of Appeal held, affirming the decisior of
North, J., that the plaintiff had no right of contribution such
as ordinarily exists between co-trustees for losses to the trust
estate due to a breach of trust for which both are equally to
blame; for that rule does not apply when one of the trustees
is also a beneficiary. In such a case, the rule is that the share
of a cestui que trust who has assented to and profited by a
breach of trust must bear the whole loss; and consequently a
trustee beneficiary who has joined in a breach of trust must
indemnify his co-trustee to the extent of his share or interest
in the trust estate, and not merely to the extent of the benefit
he has received.
Co-Trustee,
Contribution
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One who is committed to custody by an examining magis"trate in a criminal proceeding for failure to give security for
his appearance as a witness for the prosecution,
Witness
Detained for will be considered as in attendance on the court, if
Failure to
Give Bail,
Fees

his failure to give security is not due to contumacy or bad character, but solely through irfability

to do so without fault on his part, and he will be entitled to
his per diem fees as a witness for the term of his detention:
Hall v. Commissionersof Somerset County, (Court of Appeals of
Maryland,) 34 Atl. Rep. 771.
Ardemus Stewart.

